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1. Introduction
Critics of both the right and the left have questioned the utility of foreign aid.  The
conservative critique holds that aid supports large and inefficient governments that create
a bad environment for economic activity.  On the other side, the left has argued that aid
agencies have foisted structural adjustment policies on unwilling countries and that these
policies have not delivered the promised benefits.  Clearly these two critiques are
inconsistent since at the heart of structural adjustment are fiscal discipline, trade
liberalization, and other market friendly policies.  Where the different critics of aid do
agree, however, is that there are quite a few countries that have received large amounts of
aid for long periods of time and have little to show for it in terms of growth or poverty
reduction.
In this paper we revisit the question of the impact of foreign aid on growth.
Recent work by Boone (1994. 1996) found that aid had no effect on investment or growth
in a sample of developing countries. Our main innovation is to introduce economic
policies into the equation.  Does aid have a positive effect on growth in the presence of
Igood economic policies?  Have donors systematically allocated assistance in favor of
good policies?  Has aid affected policies -- for good or for ill?  These are the questions
that we address.
A modified neoclassical growth model provides the analytical framework for this
investigation.  The neoclassical model suggests that poor countries should have a high
return to capital and a fast growth rate in transition to the steady state; there are several
factors that could interfere with this result, however.  With a subsistence consumption
constraint and imperfect international capital markets, poor countries will tend to grow
slowly despite a high marginal return to investment.  In this context foreign aid can
accelerate growth rates in the transition to a steady state.  Furthermore, various
institutional and policy distortions can lower the return to capital and reduce transitional
growth rates.  We show that in such a model the impact of aid will be greater in a low
distortion environment. In general, developing country growth rates will depend on
initial income, institutional and policy distortions, aid, and aid interacted with distortions.
To investigate this model empirically we use a new data base on foreign aid
developed by the World Bank.  The grant components of concessional loans have been
added to outright grants to yield a truer estimate of foreign aid.  We draw on the recent
empirical growth literature to develop a model with a range of institutional and policy
distortions, and we estimate this equation in a panel with 56 countries and six four-year
time periods from 1970-73 until 1990-93.  Aside from institutional/political variables, the
policies that have considerable weight in this equation are the budget surplus, inflation,
and the openness dummy developed by Sachs and Warner (1995).  We form an index of
2these three policies and interact it with foreign aid; initially we take policies to be
exogenous.  We instrument for aid with population and donor interest variables.
We find that foreign aid has a positive effect on growth in a good policy
environment. The result is robust in a variety of specifications in which outliers are
included or excluded, and middle-income countries are included or excluded.  This
finding is consistent with Boone's work in that the estimated impact of aid for an
observation with average policy is zero. Countries with good policies and significant
amounts of aid (3-7% of GDP), on the other hand, perform very well, better than can be
explained by other variables in the growth regression.
Turning to allocation issues, we estimate an equation to explain aid receipts (as a
share of GDP).  Donors direct their aid to low-income countries, but are also influenced
by population (small countries get more) and by variables that reflect their own strategic
interests. After controlling for these other influences, more aid goes to countries with
good policies, as measured by our index. However, the donor interest variables seem to
overwhelm the effort to reward good policy: if one looks simply at the partial correlation
of aid and policy after controlling for income level and population, it is insignificant.  We
estimate separate aid allocation equations for bilateral and multilateral aid and find that it
is the former that is influenced by the donor interest variables.  Multilateral aid is largely
a function of income level, population, and (good) policy.
We also estimate an equation for government consumption.  We treat this
separately from the other policies because it has no robust association with growth.
We find that bilateral aid in particular has a strong positive impact on government
3consumption.  This result is consistent with other evidence that aid is fungible and tends
to increase government spending proportionately, not just  in the sector that donors think
they are financing.  That aid tends to increase government consumption, which in turn has
no positive effect on growth, provides some insight into why aid is not promoting growth
in the average recipient.
The final step in our work is to make policy endogenous and to estimate an
equation for our policy index. We find no systematic relationship between the amount of
aid that countries get and our index of fiscal, monetary, and trade policies.  There are
countries such as Ghana in which aid receipts and policy are highly and positively
correlated, and one can argue that aid has supported policy reform.  For each Ghana,
however, there is a Zambia, in which policy deteriorated continuously from 1970 until
1993, while aid receipts rose continuously.  The general result is no systematic effect of
aid on policy.  We go back to our growth regression and instrument for policy as well as
for aid and find that our basic result is robust when we treat policies as endogenous.
This work has clear implications for how to make foreign aid more effective.  It
turns out that in the 1970-93 period both the right and the left were wrong: foreign aid
had no systematic impact on the economic policies that affect growth.  However, where
aid happened to coincide with good policies, it had a strong positive effect on growth.
Otherwise, it seems to have been dissipated in unproductive government consumption.  In
allocating assistance, donors have not sufficiently exploited the relationship between
good policies and effective aid, probably because donors are pursuing a range of interests
that are not necessarily consistent.  If they want to have a large impact on growth and
4poverty reduction, then they should place greater weight on economic policies of
recipients.  In a counterfactual we reallocate 1970-93 aid by setting the coefficients on
donor interest variables to zero and doubling the coefficient on policy: such a reallocation
increases the mean growth rate of our sample by 0.2-0.3 percentage points, a large
increase relative to actual mean growth of 1.  1% per capita per annum.
Our work also suggests that the climate for effective aid is improving.  There has
been a clear shift among developing countries in favor of better policies; in our sample
the mean policy in 1990-93 was well above the 1982-85 mean.  Quite a few recent
reformers are very poor countries, such as Ethiopia, Uganda, Mali, and Vietnam.
Ironically, while the climate for effective aid is getting better, the support for aid within
rich countries is on the decline.  Real levels of aid have decreased in recent years, and in
1994 OECD countries provided the smallest level of support, relative to their own GDP,
in twenty years.
2. Methodological Approach
In this section we outline our methodological approach to measuring the impact of
aid on growth and the interaction between economic policies and the effectiveness of aid.
First, we provide some theoretical discussion of how aid might affect growth in the
context of a neoclassical growth model. Second, we discuss the sensitivity of these effects
to the introduction of strategic behavior on the part of policy-makers. Finally, we outline
our empirical approach to measuring the effects of aid on growth and the interactions
between aid and policy.
52.1 Aid in the Neoclassical Model
A series  of interesting  experiments  can be performed  in the context of a
neoclassical  model.  Imagine  a developing  country  in a world without  private capital
mobility.  Suppose  that a social  planner in this country  maximizes  the discounted  stream
of a representative  consumer's  utility given by
E  C,  - CY 
y-~~~f
where C,  represents  time-t per capita consumption,  0 < 0 < I is the discount  factor, y > 0
is the coefficient  of relative  risk aversion  and C  is a subsistence  level of consumption.
As Christiano  (1989)  and Rebelo  (1992)  have argued,  including  a subsistence  level of
consumption  in the specification  of preferences  within a neoclassical  model is a useful
way  of explaining  the positive  empirical  relationship  between  income levels and savings
rates.
The planner  maximizes  subject  to a resource  constraint  given by
C, + I, <  AK" + F,
where I, is time-t investment, K, is time-t  capital, F, is time-t  foreign  aid, A > 0 and
0 < 0  I .Capital  evolves  according  to
K,+I  = (I - 6 )K, + I,,
where 0 <6 <1.
Figure I illustrates  the implied  relationship  between  the domestic  savings rate  and
GDP in the absence  of foreign  aid. GDP is defined as Y = AK', while the savings rate  is
6defined as s, = I, / Y,. The figure is drawn for  0 = 0.4 and logarithmic utility, which
together imply quite sharply diminishing returns to capital and relatively rapid
convergence to a steady state income level even in the presence of subsistence
consumption. Notice that the savings rate first rises and then falls with the income level.
The eventual decline is explained by the assumption of diminishing returns to capital
while the initial increase is explained by the constraint put on savings behavior by
subsistence needs.
In this setting it is not hard to see how aid might be an effective instrument for
raising the income level and growth rate of a country. This is because the marginal
propensity to save in the developing country is high, even though the average propensity
to save is small. The difficulty the developing country faces is circular: because it is
growing slowly it does not generate marginal income from which it can accumulate
capital rapidly. A benevolent foreign donor providing a one-time donation representing
roughly 15% of the developing country's GDP at time 0 would cut the half-life to steady
state from 42 to 35 years and would raise the growth rate of GDP by about I percentage
point from 0.35% to 1.35%. These effects would arise because the aid would cause a
permanent upward shift in the developing country's GDP (by augmenting its capital
stock), and there is a strong relationship between the income level and growth. This
relationship is illustrated in Figure 2 (No Tax Case).
To examine the role of distortions, suppose now that in the same economy output
is taxed at a rate of 40%, and the proceeds are distributed lump-sum to consumers. The
growth performance of this economy is illustrated in Figure 2 (Tax Case). Starting at the
7same initial level of capital (and GDP) this economy will perform poorly relative to the
no-tax case, and aid will be less effective. A 15% of GDP donation will reduce the half-
life to the lower steady state from 50 to 40 years. but the increase in the growth rate of
GDP will be only about 0.6 percentage point, from 0.2% to about 0.8%.
What does this neoclassical model imply about the relationships among aid,
policy and growth? First, it suggests that one would find a positive relationship between
aid and growth, as long as the recipient's GDP is below the level corresponding to its
peak transitional growth rate. Second, it suggests that one would find a negative
relationship between distortionary taxes and growth. However, aid and policy would not
be sufficient to explain cross-sectional variation in growth even conditioning on initial
income. Consider as a benchmark the distortionary economy without aid, where the
growth rate is about 0.2%. The effect of better policy in this setting would be a rise in the
growth rate to 0.35% or an increase of 0.15 percentage point. The effect of aid, in the
absence of a policy improvement, would be a rise in the growth rate of 0.6 percentage
point. However, aid combined with a policy improvement would raise the growth rate by
more than the sum of these effects: the increase would be about 1.15 rather than 0.75
percentage point.
2.2.  The  Effects  of  Strategic  Behavior
While we form some of our intuition for the relationships among policy, aid and
growth using the neoclassical model, other factors can complicate the picture. First, the
example we gave above ignores incentive issues by assuming that aid is provided in a
lump-sum manner. Suppose, instead, that some component of aid were tied to the income
8level of the recipient, and that as that income level rose the quantity of aid would
decrease. In this case, the donor's rule for providing aid would act as a tax on capital
accumulation in the recipient country. Overall capital accumulation would rise as long as
the direct impact of donated capital was greater than the indirect tax effect, but the impact
of the aid would be less than in the lump-sum case.
Second, our example assumes either the existence of a benevolent social planner,
perfect markets in the recipient country, or some other mechanism such that outcomes are
consistent with a social optimum. There are many reasons why this may not be the case.
In reality foreign aid is intermediated by governments, and these are not always best
thought of as benevolent social planners. The incentives faced by political figures are not
necessarily the same as those faced by a social planner. Given this it is possible that aid
can have little or no impact on overall economic prosperity in the recipient country.
Mosley and Hudson (1996) and Svensson (1  996a, 1  996b) have shown that when the
donor-recipient relationship is modeled as a noncooperative game, moral hazard
problems can lead to aid having little impact on the problems it is intended to alleviate.
Aid may simply relax the budget constraint of the recipient government, without having
much impact on the amount of that budget that ultimately is used to purchase capital.
Furthermore, the donor government can also be part of this game for reasons other than
benevolence. Donor interest may lead to the suboptimal use of aid and dampen any
positive impact that it has.
While these factors and many others suggest that the positive impact of aid is
likely to be smaller than what is predicted by the neoclassical model described above, our
9priors about the impact of aid are still driven by that example. Whatever marginal
contribution aid makes to growth, we expect aid to be most effective in combination with
good policy. Furthermore, we expect that the effects of good policy are enhanced by
foreign aid.
2.3  Our Empirical  Approach
To determine empirically the relationships among aid, policies and growth we use
a panel data set on 56 countries over six four-year time periods. Several papers have
previously attempted to measure the impact of aid on savings, investment and growth in
developing countries [Chenery and Syrquin (1975), Griffin (1970), Levy (1988),
Weisskopf (1972)]. The conclusions reached by the authors of these papers have differed
widely and they have faced numerous econometric difficulties. Recent papers by Mosley,
Hudson and Horrell (1987) and Boone (1994, 1996) have concluded that aid has no
significant positive impact on growth. Our approach is similar, in that our ultimate goal is
to measure the impact of aid on growth using regression analysis. Our approach differs in
that we explicitly model the simultaneous interactions among aid. policy and growth.
One of the main empirical difficulties we face is a fundamental identification
problem. Does aid cause policy (say, owing to conditionality) or does policy cause aid
(do donors reward exogenous policy changes), and how can we separate the effects of
these variables on growth? Using two-stage least squares (2SLS) to estimate
simultaneous equations for growth, aid and policy and by making identifying
assumptions about the exogenous determinants of aid, policy and growth, we can
determine the separate impacts of aid and policy on growth. Furthermore, we are able to
10test whether aid is affected by policy or vice versa. Of course, we cannot test our entire
specification; only over-identifying assumptions are testable.
2.3.1 The Structural Model
Our model can be outlined as follows. Let g,, be the growth rate of real per capita
GDP of country i  during period t. Let y,,  be the level of real per capita GDP in country
i  at the beginning of period t. Let a,, be the level of aid as a fraction of GDP received by
country i  in period t. Let pi, be a P x I vector of policy variables in country i  at time t.
Let x,, be a  K x 1 vector of exogenous variables. Suppose that initial income, aid, policy
and some subset of the exogenous variables affect the growth rate of real GDP. This
suggests a growth equation similar to those found in the determinants of growth literature
(see Levine and Renelt, 1992 for a review):
=1  go  +yj  ,a,ga  +  p,'j,  +a,,p  gap  +x;,'fgx  +g j,  (E)
where s 9 is some mean zero scalar, B  go,  0 g,  p ga are scalars, a g  and P  gap  are P x I
vectors and  P  gr  is a  K x I vector. The interaction term a,,p, ,B  gap  allows us to capture
effects of aid and policy suggested by the neoclassical model.
Aid and policy are also endogenous and depend on the independent variables in
the system and on each other.  Thus, we consider that aid may be a function of policy
and/or that policy may be a function of aid:
a,, =  Pa0 + y,  p  +PIuI  j,ap +x,3,,tr  +F£  (2)
and
p B+1y,,Dpy  +a,p,,  +x,Bp  +P',  (3)
P",  PO  It  II1where E,,  is a zero mean scalar, c - is a zero mean  P x I vector,  3,O and  3ay are scalars,
P3ap  is a P x 1 vector,  D  3a  is a  K x I vector, D Po,,  and  D  p, are I x P vectors, and
BPT  is a K x P matrix.
We consider a number of different policy variables. For every additional policy
variable there are two additional coefficients in the growth equation because of the
interaction terms. In practice, it is difficult to estimate all of these coefficients with a
desirable amount of accuracy. For this reason, we construct a scalar policy index,
p,,  = ca  + p,',c,  as a linear combination of a set of policy variables. The policy index is
used to construct a single interaction term in the growth equation and is described in more
detail below. Since we also find it difficult to assess the individual impact of each policy
variable on aid, we use  pi,  in place of p,', in the aid equation.
It seems reasonable to assume that the error terms in the growth and aid allocation
equations are correlated. For example, suppose that in a period a country is affected by a
major shock, perhaps a drought, that is not captured by any of the x variables. If this has a
negative impact on economic growth and a positive impact on the aid received by that
country in period t, then the error terms in the aid and growth equations will be negatively
correlated. But this will imply biased estimates of f,3  and F  gap if the growth equation,
(1), is estimated by ordinary least squares. It is for this reason that we verify the
robustness of our results using a 2SLS approach.' This involves creating an instrument
for aid because it appears on the right hand side of the growth equation and is considered
12to be simultaneously determined with growth. It further requires the creation of an
instrument for policy whenever policy is assumed to be a function of aid. 2
2.3.2. Identification of the Model
With no further restrictions the system of equations (1)-(3) is underidentified. We
consider two schemes for identifying the system of equations.
Our first scheme assumes that policy is weakly exogenous in the following sense.
It assumes that policy is not contemporaneously affected by aid (  p,,u  = 0 ) although there
is the possibility of lagged feedback through the coefficient on initial income,  ,B  ,,,.  With
the further assumption that at least one of the x variables does not enter the aid equation,
and that at least two of the x variables do not enter the growth equation, the entire system
is identified. In practice, to lend greater precision to our estimates and raise the number of
degrees of freedom, we impose more zero restrictions than necessary and thereby
overidentify the system.
With this scheme, policy is assumed to be unaffected, contemporaneously, by aid
or growth so that we do not bother to estimate the policy equation. The aid equation is
given by
ai,  DaO + Yit  D ay  + At,  D ap  + Xt ( +  E j,  (4)
while the growth equation is given by
gt  =  PgO  + yi,  , j  + a,,  4 ga  +  P aagp  + a,,P,,  P  gap  + x' Pg.  + E  (5)
The effect of aid on growth is
g3  XI.ga  +  Prsgap 
13which depends on the policy index.
Our second scheme, which we view as a robustness check, allows policy to be
affected by aid. In this case, some zero restrictions are needed in the policy equation in
order to achieve identification. In this scheme we also replace the individual policy
variables in the growth equation by the policy index. This leaves us with the system
gi,  =1go +yi fi  , +  a,  D ga  +Pi,  D gp  + ai,P,P gad  +X,g  +sit  (6)
ai,  1a  0 + Yij  (IV  + Pi, P3,,f  + X,,A  + E1  (7)
and
Pi,  ipo  + y,  Pmy  + ai,  pa +  xl,p p + £.  (8)
In this case, the effects of shocks to aid are more complex. However, as will be shown in
section 4, the estimate of the coefficient  D  p  is small and insignificantly different from
zero. Therefore, it turns out that aid appears to have little impact on the policy index, and
the effect of aid on growth is approximately
ag,,  1g + Pi,  3 gap
In the next section we aiscuss our choices regarding the x variables under the first
identification scheme. We also discuss which exclusion restrictions we use to achieve
identification and why we think these are justified on a priori grounds. Then we present
estimates of our system of equations and compute the effect of aid on growth.
In section 4 we return to the policy equation and show that aid has little impact on
policy. We discuss the a priori restrictions that are necessary to identify the policy
14equation. Then we show that our results from section 3 are robust to allowing aid to affect
policy as well as vice versa.
3. Aid and Growth
To examine the effect of foreign aid on growth we develop a base specification of
the growth equation and introduce aid (properly instrumented) as well as aid interacted
with policies.  The recent empirical growth literature provides guidance concerning the
institutional/political factors and economic policies that affect growth, and we follow this
literature in building up the base specification.  The general strategy is to account for a
range of institutional and policy distortions that can help to explain the growth
performance of poor countries in order to ensure that any inferences about the
relationship between aid and growth are robust.  In this section we describe the base
specification, the data (including a new data base on foreign aid), and an initial set of
growth regressions.
3.1.  Base  Specification  of the  Growth  Equation
The equation that we want to estimate has growth depending on initial income (to
capture convergence effects), institutional/political variables, economic policies, foreign
aid, and aid interacted with policies.  In the institutional/political category we use a
measure of institutional quality that captures security of property rights and efficiency of
the government bureaucracy (Knack and Keefer, 1995). This variable is not widely
available before 1980; we use each country's  1980 figure throughout on the assumption
that institutional factors change slowly over time.  Another variable that does not change
15over time in our data set is the enthnolinguistic fractionalization variable used by Easterly
and Levine (1996).  The latter authors find that ethnic fractionalization is correlated with
bad policies and with poor growth performance after controlling for policies.  Thus the
institutional quality and the ethnic fractionalization variables capture long-term
characteristics of countries that affect both policies and growth.
We also include the assassinations variable used by several studies to capture civil
unrest, and an interactive term between ethnic fractionalization and assassinations.  The
final institutional variable is the money supply (M2) over GDP. which proxies for
distortions in the financial system (King and Levine, 1993). Because of concern over the
endogeneity of the latter variable we lag it one period.
All of the above variables we take to be exogenous.  We also include a number of
policy variables in the growth regression.  In this section we assume these to be
exogenous.  In the next section we relax that assumption and estimate a policy equation.
For policies, we use the dummy variable for trade openness developed by Sachs and
Warner (1995).  Closed economies are ones that have average tariffs on machinery and
materials above 40%, or a black market premium above 20%, or pervasive government
control of key tradables.  Following Fischer (1993), we take inflation as a measure of
monetary policy.  Finally, we have two fiscal variables suggested by Easterly and Rebelo
(1993), the budget surplus and government consumption, both relative to GDP.  The
budget surplus variable has foreign grants included in revenue and aid-financed projects
included in expenditures, so that there is no necessary relationship between aid and this
measure of the budget surplus.
16We considered some other variables that have been used in the literature, in
particular the education variables developed by Barro and Lee (1993).  We found that
these variables had little explanatory power (t-statistics well below 1.0), but their
inclusion significantly reduced the number of countries in the sample, so we did not
include them.
The growth regression is estimated as a panel using six four-year periods from
1970-73 through 1990-93. Thus an observation is a country's  performance averaged over
a four-year period. Time dummies are included in order to account for the world business
cycle.
3.2.  Data  Sources
Previous studies of foreign aid have used a measure of aid that lumps together
grants and concessional loans.  The World Bank has developed a new data base on
foreign aid (Fernandez-Arias and Serven, 1997). The underlying source is the World
Bank Debt Reporting System which contains, among other things, all of the official loans
received by developing countries from multilateral or bilateral sources.  The grant
component of each concessional loan has been calculated and added to outright grants to
provide a more accurate measure of foreign aid.  These data are in current U.S. dollars.
For our study we converted them into constant 1985 dollars using the unit-value of
imports price index from the IFS.  This provides a measure of aid that is constant in terms
of its purchasing power over a representative bundle of world imports.  Finally, we
divided this aid figure by real GDP in constant 1985 prices from the Summers and Heston
(Penn World Tables 5.6) data set.
17The aid data cover a large number of countries.  However, the institutional and
policy variables are not available for many countries.  We were able to collect the
requisite information for 56 countries.  Some countries are missing data in some time
periods, so that we end up with a total of 272 observations.  The countries covered are
listed in Appendix Table 1. Twenty-one African countries are included, as well as major
aid recipients in other regions.  Clearly good coverage of poor countries is important if
the results are to be robust.  Note, however, that countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and
Chile are also included.  These are middle-income countries with good access to
international capital markets.  Not surprisingly they have been getting a tiny amount of
aid throughout this period (an average of 0.02% of GDP for Brazil, for example). Thus,
we have chosen to examine the relationship between aid and growth first using the
maximum number of observations available and then using a smaller data set in which
middle-income countries are dropped.  Appendix Table I indicates the countries that are
dropped in the latter analysis.
The dependent variable in our study is the growth rate of real GDP per capita,
from the World Bank data base.  Table I provides summary statistics for a few key
variables.  The mean growth rate was 1.2% for the 272 observations in the full sample,
and 1.1% for the low-income sample (189 observations).  Because we have measured aid
relative to real PPP-adjusted GDP we end up with smaller aid/GDP figures than reported
in other studies.  For the whole sample the mean value of aid/GDP was 1.6% (2.1% for
the low-income sample). Nevertheless, there are some very large aid recipients, such as
18Zambia (1 1% of GDP in the 1990-93 period). The other explanatory variables in our
growth regressions have been noted above.
3.3. OLS Growth Regressions
The OLS regression with our base specification -- but without aid -- is broadly
consistent with the empirical growth literature (Table 2. Regression 1). The most robust
variables are institutional quality, inflation, and trade openness.  Other variables have the
intuitive signs; however, with so many variables included it is not surprising that t-
statistics on some variables are in the 1-2 range. Note that regional dummies for Sub-
Saharan Africa and East Asia have moderate explanatory power, their significance being
marginal, at least in regression (1), our base specification.  In all of the growth
regressions with aid included, this same set of variables will be retained, even if some t-
statistics become very low. We choose this approach so that the reader does not wonder
about the effect of including or excluding different variables.
A final point about the base regression is that government consumption has only a
very weak negative relationship with growth.  If government consumption is dropped, the
coefficients on the other variables remain about the same [regression (2)].  We choose to
retain government consumption for reasons that will become clear later.  Excluding it
does not affect any results.
We use regression (2) to form a policy index comprised of the budget surplus,
inflation, and trade openness.  We are interested in the interaction of aid and policies, and
frankly we do not think that we have enough information to simultaneously interact aid
with several policies.  If we interact aid with only one policy there is always the danger
19that the interaction is proxying for interaction with a different policy; not surprisingly the
policy measures are positively correlated.  The policy index is formed by using the
regression coefficients from regression (2):
Policy = 1.3 +5.4 x Budget surplus - 1.4 x Inflation + 2.1 x Openness.
Thus we let the growth regression determine the relative importance of the different
policies. 3 The constant, 1.3, is the impact of all of the other variables in the regression
(excluding the time dummies) evaluated at each variable's mean.  The index can be
interpreted as a country's predicted growth rate. given its budget, inflation, and trade
policies, assuming that it had the mean values of other characteristics.  Since the time
dummies have been excluded it is the predicted growth rate in the world economic
conditions of 1990-93 (the benchmark period).
Consistent with its large coefficient in the growth regression, the openness
dummy has a large impact on the policy index. Note that the index can be negative if
inflation is high or if the budget deficit is very large.  The data set contains a number of
observations with a negative value for the policy index.  For both the whole data set and
for the low-income countries alone the mean of the index is 1.3 with a standard deviation
of 1.2 (Table 1). To examine interactive effects, we form a variable, Aid/GDP times
Policy, and a quadratic term, (Aid/GDP)2 times Policy.4
Before instrumenting for aid it is interesting to look first at the OLS regression
with aid included (Table 2, Regression 3). When Aid/GDP alone is introduced into the
growth regression it has an insignificant positive coefficient.  An interesting story
emerges, however, when Aid/GDP x Policy and (Aid/GDP) 2 x Policy are added
20(Regression 4).  Aid still has a zero coefficient. but aid interacted with policy is
significantly positive, while the quadratic term is significantly negative.  These results
imply that the impact of aid on growth is a function both of the level of policy and of the
level of aid.  It turns out that the quadratic term depends on five big outliers that we will
discuss in more detail below.  If these outliers are dropped, the quadratic term becomes
insignificant and the t-statistic on Aid/GDP x Policy is much larger (Regression 5).
This regression indicates that the derivative of growth with respect to aid is an
increasing and linear function of policy, as graphed in Figure 3.  When the quadratic term
is significant, this relationship is still linear, but the slope depends on the level of aid. At
the mean level of aid regression (4) generates a line virtually identical to regression (5).
As aid increases (decreases) the line sweeps downward (upward) with the same y-
intercept. In other words, there are diminishing marginal returns to aid.
There are two aspects of the derivative of growth with respect to aid with which
we are concerned.  First, is the slope in the policy dimension significantly positive, which
tells us whether aid is more effective in a good policy environment?  Second, is the
derivative positive when evaluated at a "good" level of policy, for example, at policy =
2.5 (one standard deviation above the policy mean)?  For regression (5), the answer to
both questions is "yes," at a .01 confidence level.  The question that we turn to next is
how robust those results are.
3.4. Two-Stage  Least Squares  Growth  Regressions
There are several reasons to be skeptical about the OLS results presented above.
First, we did not take account of the likely endogeneity of aid.  Second, the data set
21combines low-income and middle-income countries, which may not be appropriate.
Third, we have not checked for the importance of outliers.  In this section we address all
three issues.
Boone (1994, 1996) has shown that there are good instruments tor aid that can be
used to address endogeneity problems.  Aid/GDP is a function of a number of variables
that do not belong in the growth regression, notably population, infant mortality rate, and
proxies for donors' strategic interests.  We use these as instruments in a two-stage least
squares regression.  This procedure purges the correlation of Aid/GDP with the error term
in the growth regression, and ensures that we capture some portion of Aid/GDP not
explained by the other variables in the growth regression.  Thus, the fact that aid goes
primarily to poor countries with weak institutions and growth-inducing characteristics is
controlled for, as is the possibility that emergency aid responds to negative shocks to
growth.  The specific donor interest variables that we use as instruments are dummies for
the Franc zone in Africa, Central American countries (which are in the U.S. sphere of
influence), and Egypt, and a measure of arms imports as a share of total imports (lagged
one period to address potential endogeneity).
We are also instrumenting for the interactive term, Aid/GDP x Policy, and the
quadratic term, (Aid/GDP)2 x Policy. Thus we include some nonlinear instruments such
as Population x Policy and Infant mortality x Policy.
The TSLS regression with aid but not the interactive term confirms the OLS
result: a coefficient on Aid/GDP not different from zero (Table 3, Regression 6). The
TSLS regression with the interactive and quadratic terms is also consistent with the OLS
22result in that the coefficient on Aid/GDP x Policy is positive, while the coefficient on
(Aid/GDP)2 x Policy is negative. The t-statistics are not very large: however, what we
are interested in are linear combinations of these coefficients, not the coefficients
themselves.  The derivative of growth with respect to aid, calculated from regression (7),
is plotted in Figure 3.  It is a function of the level of aid, and here it is plotted for
Aid/GDP = 3.7% of GDP. one standard deviation above the aid mean.  It can be seen that
this line is similar to the OLS regression except that it has shifted down.  The slope of
this line is significantly different from zero at a .10 level of confidence. If this
relationship is evaluated at the mean of aid (1.6), the line is steeper, but we have less
statistical confidence that the slope is different from zero.
If the five outliers are dropped, we get regression (8).  It can be seen in Figure 3
that this result is virtually identical to regression (7) when the latter is evaluated at
Aid/GDP = 3.7.  For both regressions (7) and (8) the point estimates on the derivative of
growth with respect to aid are positive at Policy = 2.5.  However, we do not have a high
degree of confidence that these estimates are different from zero.  Because the slope of
the relationship is significantly positive, however, our confidence that aid has a positive
impact increases as we move further out in the policy dimension.
The next step in our analysis was to drop middle-income countries; these
countries have good access to international capital markets and there is no compelling
reason to think that their growth rates would be affected by aid.  We arbitrarily defined
middle-income as countries with real per capita GDP above $1900 both at the beginning
23(1970-73) and end (1990-93) of the time period.  This eliminated 16 countries (listed in
Appendix Table 1) and left 40 countries and 189 observations.
The TSLS regression for the restricted data set has stronger results in the sense of
coefficients and t-statistics larger in absolute value (Table 4).  In can be seen in Figure 3
that the impact of policy on the effectiveness of aid is much sharper in regression (9) than
in regression (7).  One thing that has happened is that the coefficient on openness is no
longer significantly positive, and the regression is putting a large weight on the
interactive term, Aid/GDP x Policy. This result conveys the important information that
among low-income countries all of the good policy observations are either large aid
recipients or in East Asia (note that the coefficient on the dummy is now larger).  When
the Chile's and Mexico's  are included in the data set, the coefficient on openness is larger
and the coefficient on Aid/GDP x Policy is positive but smaller than in regression (9).
Thus, if you think that the experience of Chile or Mexico conveys useful information
about what would happen to a low-income reformer without aid, you should prefer the
estimate of regression (7).  If you are skeptical that reformers such as Mali and Ghana
will obtain the same impact from reform as Chile and Mexico than you should prefer the
results from the data set that excludes the middle-income countries.  Fortunately, at
dispute here is only the quantitative estimate of the impact of policy on aid effectiveness.
The qualitative results so far are quite robust.
We turn next to the issue of outliers.  To get an insight into their role, we dropped
the quadratic term from regression (9) but left the outliers in the data set, yielding
regression (10).  In Figure 4 we have plotted the part of growth not explained by the
24variables in regression (10) other than Aid/GDP x Policy against Aid/GDP x Policy.  This
figure reveals that there are two big negative outliers and three big positive outliers in the
Aid/GDP x Policy dimension. 5 These observations are more than five standard
deviations from the mean of the data set that remains when they are dropped.  The model
with the quadratic term fits these data nicely [as evidenced by the 1.78 t-statistic on the
quadratic term in regression (9)].  However, their inclusion greatly increases the slope of
the growth-(Aid/GDP x Policy) relationship in the area near the mean of the data set.  We
want to emphasize that including the outliers strengthens our basic story; but we think
that they lead to an overestimate of the impact of Aid/GDP x Policy on growth in the
range where most of the observations are located.
As we expect, dropping the outliers reduces the coefficient on Aid/GDP x Policy
from 1.53 in regression (9) to .68 in regression (11). The t-statistic is much larger, at
3.18, and the t-statistic on the Aid/GDP coefficient is also large (2.15).  Without the
outliers the quadratic term is insignificant. The plot of regression (I 1) in Figure 3 is
about the same as that of regression (9), when the latter is evaluated at Aid/GDP = 3.7.
The problem with the regressions that include the outliers is that the slope of this line is
implausibly large when evaluated at low levels of aid.
In the last regression in this section we replace the actual policies -- budget
surplus, inflation, and openness -- with the index of these policies [regression (12)].  The
results for Aid/GDP and Aid/GDP x Policy are about the same as in regression ( 11). In
the next section we will treat Policy as an endogenous variable and re-estimate this last
equation with instruments for Policy.
25Table 5 provides a useful summary of the TSLS results obtained with and without
middle-income countries and with and without outliers.  The derivative of growth with
respect to aid has been consistently estimated to be insignificantly different from zero for
observations with average policy (=1.3).  The point estimates for this derivative evaluated
at a good policy level (=2.5) are all positive.  From the low-income country data set we
have good confidence that these estimates are significantly different from zero. In the full
data set we would have to go to a higher level of policy before we would have such
confidence. The most consistent and robust result is that aid has a larger impact on
growth in a good policy environment: this result emerges from all of the regressions with
confidence ranging from the .01 to the .10 level. 6
The reason why this result is so robust can be seen in Figure 4.  Our results arise
from the presence of more than 20 observations with an Aid/GDP x Policy measure
above 4.9.  It is remarkable that all of these observations have positive unexplained
growth. In principle one could have an Aid/GDP x Policy measure around 5 through a
combination of large amounts of aid and mediocre policies.  In fact, most of these
observations have good policy -- in the 2-3 range -- and amounts of aid in the 3-7% of
GDP range.  It is this group that is consistently growing well -- better than can be
explained by the other variables in the growth regressions.  These observations cover a
wide range of countries including Mali, Ghana, Botswana, Bolivia, El Salvador, and
Honduras.
264. Aid and Policies
Up to this point we have taken policies to be exogenous.  In this section we relax
that assumption in order to investigate whether aid has affected policies and/or whether
policies have influenced the distribution of aid.  To answer these questions we need to
make assumptions about which independent variables can be excluded from the different
equations.
We begin by estimating an equation for the allocation of Aid/GDP.  There is a
literature that has addressed this question [Maizels and Nissanke (1984); McKinlay and
Little (1978, 1979); Frey and Schneider (1986), Trumbull and Wall (1994)].  In general
this literature has found that donors' strategic interests play an important role in the
allocation of aid, whereas commercial interests have not been important.  Furthermore.
aid is given to countries with low income, and aid/GDP is much higher for countries with
small populations.  Frey and Schneider find evidence that commitment of World Bank
assistance is associated with good policies such as low inflation, but no one has examined
whether total aid is allocated in favor of good policies.
The aid allocation equation has large negative coefficients on initial income and
population (Table 6).  To capture donors' strategic interests we use dummy variables for
Sub-Saharan Africa (to which most European aid is directed), the Franc zone (which gets
special treatment from France), Egypt (ally of the U.S.). and Central American countries
(also in the U.S. sphere of influence). All of these, except the dummy for Sub-Saharan
Africa, have large positive coefficients in the aid allocation equation.  To capture strategic
interests we also use a measure of arms imports relative to total imports lagged one
27period.  This variable helps explain the allocation of aid to middle-income countries, but
has only minor relevance in the low-income country data set.
In the aid equation we instrument for policy using the political-institutional
variables from the growth regression.  Thus, a key assumption is that these variables do
not belong in the aid equation directly.  Also, we have two approaches to making the
policy index endogenous.  In one variant we treat the Sachs-Warner openness dummy as
exogenous and use it as an instrument, and in the other variant we do not use it as an
instrument.  Results for the aid equation are similar. and here we present the former
variant.  It can be seen that policy has a positive coefficient with a t-statistic of 3.63,
indicating that donors do reward good policy, after controlling for income, population,
and strategic interests.
We estimate separate equations for bilateral and multilateral aid, and for World
Bank aid which is part of the latter. The donor interest variables are more important for
bilateral than for multilateral aid, for which only the Franc zone dummy is important.  In
each equation there is a significant positive coefficient on policy.  For total, bilateral, and
multilateral aid the coefficients indicate that a one standard deviation improvement in the
policy index would increase aid receipts by about one-fifth of the mean level of
assistance; for World Bank aid the increase is one-third of the mean level.  Note that the
mean level of bilateral aid is more than twice that of multilateral aid, and that the World
Bank represents only about one-quarter of the latter.
While donors have made some effort to reward good policy, they are pursuing
other interests as well. Some evidence that these different objectives conflict can be
28gained by looking simply at the partial correlation of aid and policy after controlling for
income level and population (Table 7). For bilateral aid this correlation is essentially
zero. indicating that countries with the same populations and level of income but different
policies have received the same level of assistance on average.  Thus, the allocation of aid
toward donors' friends tends to direct it to poor policies: after controlling for those effects
donors make some effort to reward good policy.  The net effect is to make bilateral aid
orthogonal to policy after adjusting for income level and population.  For multilateral and
World Bank aid, the partial correlation with policy is positive and quite strong.
Turning to the policy equation, we estimate it as a function of the institutional-
political variables that are also in the growth regression and of aid, for which we
instrument.  From a theoretical point of view, the coefficient on aid could go either way.
Since good policies are one factor influencing allocations. aid may promote such policies.
On the other hand, it is easy to see how aid might lead to bad policies.  We have pointed
out that there is no necessary relationship between aid and the budget surplus measure
that is one our policies.  But the fact of donor support may increase poor countries' access
to capital markets and result in larger borrowings and deficits.  The existence of aid to
finance imports might also reduce the need of closed economies to liberalize their trade
regimes to encourage exports.  A priori, the effect of aid on policies could go either way.
The key to identifying the policy equation is the assumption that variables such as
population and the Franc zone dummy belong in the aid equation but not in the policy
equation.  With this approach, we find the effect of aid on policies to be insignificantly
different from zero (Table 8).  Some may find this result surprising, but there are a
29number of reasons to believe it. On looking more closel'  at the data, we found that
donors are inconsistent in their treatment of policy.  For example. Ghana's aid receipts
mirror fairly closely its policy performance. with aid increasing as it reformed (Figure 5).
In Zambia, on the other hand, the exact opposite is observed: policy deteriorated
continuously throughout this period while aid climbed continuously (Figure 6).  More
generally, there is very little correlation between aid and policy (Figure 7).  We interpret
these results to mean that donors have been pursuing different objectives that are not
necessarily consistent, and as a result there has not been any systematic influence of aid
on policy.
We also estimate an equation for government consumption (Table 8).  We
retained this variable throughout the growth analysis in order to reiterate that it has no
robust association with growth.  It turns out that government consumption is strongly a
function of aid.  We model government consumption as a function of the institutional-
political variables that affect our  policy index.  Following other literature, we also
include population and the dependency ratio of the population as explanatory variables
(Rodrik, 1996). In this equation we distinguish between bilateral aid and multilateral aid;
the former has a large positive association with government consumption whereas the
latter has none.  Since we think that population belongs in this equation as an explanatory
variable, the key instruments now are donor interest variables.  The results suggest that
the aid associated with donor interests -- primarily bilateral aid -- increases government
consumption, which in turn has no positive association with growth.  This result provides
some insight into why aid is not effective in the typical recipient.  The simple relationship
30between bilateral aid and government consumption is plotted in Figure 8 and is quite
striking. 8
The final step in our work is to re-estimate the growth equation treating both aid
and policy as endogenous.  Since the institutional-political variables are included in the
growth regression, there is a question as to which instruments to use for policy.  One
option is to treat the Sachs-Warner openness dummy as exogenous and to create
instruments that interact this with other exogenous variables such as population.  We
already have evidence that aid has not systematically affected policy.  Thus the main
endogeneity that we are concerned with here is correlation of the error term in the policy
equation with the error term in the growth equation.  In other words, inflation and budget
surplus are not strictly speaking choice variables of the government: they combine policy
choices with shocks.  A negative shock to growth could cause a negative shock to the
quality of budget or inflation policies.  A similar argument cannot be made about the
zero-one trade openness dummy.  Table 8 presents the growth regression with the policy
index treated as endogenous and with the openness dummy as an instrument.  Results are
shown both with and without the outliers.  The results are very similar to the regressions
in which policy is treated as exogenous [for example, regression (12) in Table 4].  In
particular, we still have 95% confidence that the derivative of growth with respect to aid
is a positive function of policy.
9
Thus, there is robust evidence that aid has a positive effect on growth in an
environment of good fiscal, monetary, and trade policies.  Aid has not systematically
affected these policies during the 1970-93 period; but when good policy and aid have
31happened to coincide the outcome has been very good.  These results imply that aid
would be more effective if greater effort were made to direct it to good policy performers.
The potential'benefits from such a change can be gauged through a simple counterfactual.
We reallocated 1970-93 aid for our sample of poor countries by setting the coefficients on
the donor interest variables to zero and by doubling the coefficient on policy in the aid
equation (Table 6).  (We scaled the result to have the same mean as the actual data.)  This
reallocation shifts resources from donors'  friends to countries with good policy.  The
estimated impact on growth can be calculated from the coefficients of the growth
regressions.  Using regression (8) the mean change in growth rate would be .17
percentage point; with regression (12) the mean change would be .34.  The difference
stems from the fact that the estimated impact of aid is much greater in the regressions that
exclude the middle-income countries.  The actual mean growth rate of our poor countries
was 1.1  %, so that the impact of a more efficient allocation of aid would be quite
significant.
A final point is that there is !  marked trend toward better policy among poor
countries, which means that the climate for effective aid is improving.  In our sample the
mean of the policy index reached a nadir of 1.0 in the 1982-85 period, and then climbed
to a peak of 1.8 in the most recent period, 1990-93. We emphasized that the effect of aid
was consistently estimated to be positive for a policy level of 2.5: by 1990-93 15 of our
40 poor countries had attained that level.  Going beyond our samp1g,  Sachs and Warner
(1995) identify 35 developing countries that liberalized between 1985 and 1994. Many of
these countries are very poor, including Benin, Cameroon, Ghana, India, Kenya, Mali,
32Nepal, Uganda, and Zambia.  Hence there are many good opportunities to address
poverty in an efficient manner.  Ironically, the past two years have seen cutbacks in the
financing of foreign aid: in 1994 OECD countries gave the smallest amount, as a share of
their GDP, in twenty years.  Thus, the climate for effective aid is improving, while the
amount of aid diminishes.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated several questions regarding the interactions
among foreign aid, economic policies and growth. Our primary question concerned the
effect of aid on growth.  Consistent with other authors, we found that on average aid has
had little impact on growth. However, a robust finding was that aid has a positive impact
on growth in a good policy environment. This effect goes beyond the direct impact that
the policies themselves have on growth.
A second question concerned the allocation of aid: do donors reward good policy?
We found that on the margin good policies are rewarded by higher aid.  I0 However, we
found that other variables, which we regard as reflecting donor interest, have even greater
explanatory power in the aid allocation equations for total and bilateral aid. This finding,
combined with a separate finding that bilateral aid is strongly positively correlated with
government consumption, may help to explain why the impact of foreign aid on growth is
not more broadly positive.
Finally, we assessed what we consider to be an interesting counterfactual.
Suppose more aid were allocated on the basis of policy rather than on the basis of donor
33interest, while leaving the total quantity of aid, and the policies of recipients, unchanged.
Our results suggest that this would raise the mean growth rate in our sample of poor
countries from 1.  10% to 1.44%. We think that this is interesting food for thought at a
time when the policies of recipients are generally improving while the world budget for
aid is shrinking.
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outliers is similar.  Recall that two of the outliers have very bad policy and large aid, and three have very
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relationship.
° The observant reader will note that 1% of GDP in bilateral aid is associated with 4.3% of GDP in
government consumption.  This is possible because aid is measured relative to real GDP at international
prices whereas government consumption is relative to GDP at local prices.  The consumption price level in
developing countries is about one-quarter of the international level. The investment price level, on the
other hand, is about the same in developing and developed countries.
9If  we make the stronger assumption that the trade openness dummy is endogenous and eliminate it as an
instrument the result is similar in that aid/GDP has a significant negative coefficient and Aid/GDP x Policy
has a significant positive coefficient.  In this variant there is a large negative coefficient on the policy index
itself, but a large standard error as well.  This reflects the fact that there are no good instruments for policy
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C°  Conditioning on our other, in some cases nontestable, identifying assumptions, we found that the reverse
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38Table  1. Aid, Policies and  Growth:  Summary  Statistics
Per Capita GDP  Per Capita GDP
Growth  1970-73  Aid/GDP  Policy  Aid x Policy
(% p.a-)  (1985 $)  (%)  (Index)
All Obs. (2721
Mean  1.2  1833  1.6  1.3  1.8
Median  1.3  1419  0.8  1.0  0.8
Standard deviation  3.6  1479  2.1  1.2  4.8
Low-Income (189)
Mean  1.1  1138  2.1  1.3  2.4
Median  1.2  1132  1.3  1.0  1.2
Standard deviation  3.6  471  2.3  1.2  5.7
Low-Income w/o
5 Outliers  (184!
Mean  1.2  1138  1.9  1.3  2.1
Median  1.2  1132  1.2  1.0  1.2
Standard deviation  3.6  471  1.9  1.1  3.2
39Table 2.  OLS Panel Growth Regressions
(including Middle Income Countries)
Time  dimension:  six four-year  periods, 1970-73  to 1990-93
Countries:  56 aid recipients
Dependent  variable:  Growth  rate  of per capita  GDP
Regression  No.  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Observations  284  287  272  272  267
Constant  2.53  2.62  1.60  .56  .92
(.65)  (.71)  (.35)  (.12)  (.19)
Initial  GDP per capita  -.60  -.60  -.48  -.39  -.44
(1.04)  (1.15)  (.75)  (.60)  (.65)
Ethnic  fractionalization  -.007  -.006  -.006  -.005  -.005
(.90)  (.81)  (.78)  (.67)  (.66)
Assassinations  -.42  -.45  -.40  -.42  -.43
(1.50)  (1.63)  (1.45)  (1.54)  (1.58)
Ethnic  x assassin  .008  .008  .007  .007  .007
(1.63)  (1.74)  (1.53)  (1.54)  (1.60)
Institutional  quality  .66  .65  .66  .67  .71
(3.75)  (3.75)  (3.70)  (3.76)  (3.95)
M2/GDP  (lagged)  .012  .008  .021  .028  .022
(.95)  (.62)  (1.37)  (1.65)  (1.27)
Sub-Saharan  Africa  -1.43  -1.58  -1.33  -1.42  -1.47
(1.68)  (2.18)  (1.54)  (1.63)  (1.68)
East  Asia  .81  .86  .89  1.12  1.26
(1.43)  (1.52)  (1.53)  (1.83)  (2.05)
Budget  surplus  4.07  5.35  4.39  2.27  .90
(1.03)  (1.68)  (1.08)  (.50)  (.18)
Inflation  -1.56  -1.41  -1.58  -1.21  -1.19
(3.92)  (3.46)  (3.94)  (2.51)  (2.16)
Openness  2.11  2.07  2.17  1.83  1.61
(4.11)  (4.07)  (4.13)  (3.32)  (2.76)
Gov consumption  -2.53  --  -7.35  -9.14  -8.25
(.55)  (1.41)  (1.77)  (1.43)
Aid/GDP  --  --  .09  .08  -.05
(.82)  (.58)  (.27)
Aid  x Policy  --  --  --  .19  .24
(1.63)  (2.87)
Aid2  x Policy  --  --  --  -.02  --
(1.68)
R  2  .41  .41  .40  .40  .40
Adjusted  R 2 .38  .38  .35  .35  .35
Note: i-statistics  (in parentheses)  have been  calculated  with White's heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard
errors,  for all regressions  in the paper.
40Table 3.  TSLS Panel Growth Regressions
(Including Middle Income Countries)
Time dimension: six four-year periods,  1970-73 to 1990-93
Countries: 56 aid recipients
Dependent variable: Growth rate of per capita GDP
Regression No.  (6)  (7)  (8)
Observations  272  272  267
Constant  4.20  3.34  5.25
(.75)  (.53)  (.81)
Initial GDP per capita  -.81  -.84  -.95
(1.06)  (1.06)  (1.  1)
Ethnic fractionalization  -.009  -.010  -.010
(1.05)  (.88)  (1.03)
Assassinations  -.40  -.46  -.39
(1.40)  (1.59)  (1.38)
Ethnic x assassin  .007  .007  .007
(1.52)  (1.49)  (1.45)
Institutional quality  .63  .63  .69
(3.42)  (3.10)  (3.70)
M2/GDP (lagged)  .025  .052  .019
(1.48)  (1.43)  (1.14)
Sub-Saharan Africa  -.95  -.84  -.92
(1.12)  (.81)  (1.00)
East Asia  .67  1.31  1.24
(I.10)  (1.85)  (1.88)
Budget surplus  4.16  -4.09  -.08
(1.00)  (.67)  (.01)
Inflation  -1.57  -.18  -1.16
(3.76)  (.18)  (2.09)
Openness  2.41  1.39  1.46
(4.13)  (1.58)  (2.06)
Gov consumption  -4.14  -7.10  -2.59
(.63)  (.80)  (.30)
Aid/GDP  -.16  -.52  -.58
(.27)  (1.07)  (1.23)
Aid x Policy  --  .68  .32
(1.21)  (1.78)
Aid 2 x Policy  --  -.05
(.86)
R  2  .39  .33  .38
Adjusted R 2 .34  .28  .33
Instruments: Pop (Ln population), pop2, Inf (infant mortality beginning of period), lnf2, Pop x Policy, Inf
x Policy, armns  imports (lagged), dummies for Egypt, franc zone countries, Central American countries.
41Table 4. TSLS Panel Growth Regressions (excluding Middle Income Countries)
Time dimension: six four-year periods. 1970-73 to 1990-93
Countries: 40 aid recipients
Dependent variable: Growth rate of per capita GDP
RegressionNo.  (9)  (10)  (1)  (12)
Observations  |  189  189  184  184
Constant  3.49  10.9  7.58  5.94
(.39)  (1.33)  (.80)  (.65)
Initial GDP per capita.  -1.26  -1.87  -1.53  -1.26
(1.09)  (1.68)  (1.17)  (1.02)
Ethnic fractionalization  -.013  -.022  -.013  -.009
(.89)  (1.70)  (1.11)  (.84)
Assassinations  -1.15  -.51  -.74  -.76
(1.78)  (.96)  (1.46)  (1.54)
Ethnic x assassin  .006  .003  .003  .002
(.47)  (.35)  (.23)  (.20)
Institutional quality  .87  .92  .97  .93
(3.16)  (4.16)  (4.48)  (4.39)
M2/GDP (lagged)  .091  .029  .026  .024
(1.74)  (1.45)  (1.17)  (1.22)
Sub-Saharan Africa  -1.83  -1.11  -1.84  -2.10
(1.73)  (1.31)  (2.34)  (2.75)
East Asia  3.53  1.52  2.38  2.33
(2.46)  (1.74)  (2.73)  (2.72)
Budget surplus  -14.1  -4.64  -4.06  --
(1.65)  (.63)  (.64)
Inflation  3.78  .92  .85  --
(1.55)  (.55)  (.65)
Openness  -.99  1.56  .09  --
(.53)  (1.46)  (.08)
Gov consumption  -10.4  .41  .92  1.38
(1.01)  (.06)  (1 1l)  (.18)
Policy  --  --  --  -. 04
(.08)
Aid/GDP  -.94  -1.01  -1.03  -.82
(1.69)  (1.81)  (2.15)  (1.81)
Aid x Policy  1.53  .37  .68  .58
(2.30)  (1.69)  (3.18)  (3.22)
Aid
2 x Policy  -.11  --  --  --
(1.78)
R  2  .22  .37  .43  .45
Adjusted R 2 .13  .30  .36  .39
Instruments: Pop (Ln population), Pop 2,  Inf (infant mortality beginning of period), Infe,
Pop x Policy, Inf x Policy, arms imports (lagged), dummies for Egypt, franc zone countries, Central
American countries
42Table 5.  Estimated Impact of Aid on Growth
Derivative of growth wii:h  respect to
Aid/GDP estimated from regression no.
Evaluated at:  (7)  (8)  (9)  (11)  (12)
(a)  Policy=  1.3  -.16  -.16  .02  -.15  -.07
(b) Policy = 2.5  .18  .22  .9a  .67 b  .63b
Difference  .34b  .38b  89c  82d  .70d
(b) - (a)
Significantly different from zero at:
(a) .15 level; (b) .10 level; (c) .05 level; (d) .01  Ilevel
43Table 6.  TSLS Aid Allocation Regressions
Time dimension: six four-year periods, 1970-73 to 1990-93
Countries: 40 aid recipients
Dependent variable: Aid as a percent of GDP
Type of Aid  I otal  Bilateral  Multilateral  World Bank
Mean  2.16  1.47  .69  .16
Observations  191  191  191  191
Constant  35.8  19.8  15.9  4.57
(7.25)  (8.67)  (5.20)  (5.46)
Initial GDP per capita  -2.67  -1.44  -1.23  -0.43
(6.90)  (6.72)  (5.50)  (6.56)
Population  -.85  -0.49  -.36  -0.07
(6.57)  (7.75)  (4.76)  (3.52)
Policy  .44  .28  .15  0.05
(3.63)  (3.54)  (2.89)  (3.00)
Sub-Saharan Africa  -0.03  0.32  -0.34  -.10
(0.06)  (1.59)  (1.32)  (1.36)
Egypt  1.71  1.55  0.16  0.09
(4.11)  (4.28)  (1.10)  (1.62)
Franc Zone  .52  .30  .22  .04
(1.46)  (1.16)  (1.66)  (0.53)
Central America  0.73  .84  -0.11  -0.03
(1.64)  (2.58)  (0.54)  (0.46)
Arms imports (lagged)  .0.01  0.01  0.001  -0.002
(0.88)  (0.94)  (0.44)  (2.11)
R2  .62  .56  .57  .51
Adjusted R 2 .59  .52  .54  .47
Instruments:  Ethnic, assassinations, ethnic x assassin, institutional quality, M2/GDP (lagged), East
Asia, lnf, Pop x openness, inf x openness, institutions x openness, pop2,  inf
44Table 7. Partial Correlation of Aid and Policy
Time dimension: six four-year periods. 1970-73 to 1990-93
Countries: 40 aid recipients
Dependent variable: Aid as a percent of GDP
Type of Aid  Total  Bilateral  Multilateral  World Bank
Mean  2.16  1.47  0.69  0.16
Observations  191  191  191  191
Constant  34.6  20.8  13.8  3.81
(16.5)  (13.9)  (15.0)  (12.3)
Initial GDP per capita  -2.49  -1.45  -1.03  -0.35
(11.3)  (9.22)  (10.6)  (10.8)
Population  -0.81  -0.48  -0.32  -0.06
(11.0)  (9.21)  (10.0)  (5.67)
Policy  0.14  0.01  0.13  0.05
(1.43)  (0.20)  (2.91)  (3.17)
R2  0.61  0.52  0.56  0.49
Adjusted R 2 0.59  0.50  0.54  0.46
45Table 8.  TSLS Regressions with Policy as an Endogenous Variable
Time dimension: six four-year periods,  1970-73 to 1990-93
Countries: 40 aid recipients
Government  Per Capita  Per Capita
Dependent variable  Policy  Consumption  GDP Growth  GDP Growth
Observations  191  183  189  184
Constant  -0.93  -66.9  1.68  7.02
(.53)  (2.02)  (0.21)  (.76)
Initial GDP per capita  0.29  7.14  -0.87  -1.39
(1.25)  (2.74)  (0.82)  (1.12)
Ethnic fractionalization  0.004  0.01  -0.003  -.009
(1.22)  (1.04)  (0.26)  (.80)
Assassinations  0.29  -1.72  -1.39  -.85
(2.33)  (1.95)  (2.26)  (1.67)
Ethnic x Assassin  -0.009  0.03  0.009  .002
(2.87)  (1.54)  (0.76)  (.17)
Institutional quality  .27  -0.81  0.61  .91
(3.24)  (2.19)  (2.06)  (4.07)
M2/GDP (lagged)  -0.02  0.08  0.10  .03
(2.52)  (1.30)  (1.81)  (1.38)
Sub-Saharan Africa  -0.36  2.16  -2.50  -2.19
(1.68)  (1.95)  (2.50)  (2.71)
East Asia  1.29  -1.71  2.77  2.64
(7.15)  (1.59)  (1.55)  (2.26)
Aid/GDP  -0.01  --  -0.41  -1.00
(0.15)  (0.75)  (1.80)
Bilateral Aid/GDP  --  4.34
(3.17)
Multilateral Aid/GDP  --  -0.56
(0.29)
Population  --  0.96
(1.17)
Dependent Population  --  0.03
(0.56)
46Table 8 (continuation)
Government  Per Capita  Per Capita
Dependent variable  Policy  Consumption  GDP Growth  GDP Growth
Observations  191  183  189  184
Policy  --  --  -0.17  -.24
(0.14)  (.30)
Gov consumption  --  --  -4.72  1.50
(0.43)  (.1  9)
Aid x Policy  --  --  1.27  .76
(1.58)  (2.05)
Aid2 x Policy  --  --  -0.11  --
(1.65)
R  2  0.40  0.18  0.24  0.42
Adjusted R 2 0.35  0.09  0.16  0.36
Instruments:  Population  Same  Same plus  Same
lnf  Pop x openness
pop 2 lnf x openness





47Appendix Table 1. Countries Included in the Data Set
Sub-Saharan  |  l  l
Africa  Latin America  MENA  East Asia  |  South Asia
Botswana  Bolivia  Algeria  Indonesia  India
Cameroon*  Dominican Rep.  Egypt  Korea  Pakistan
Cote d'lvoire*  Ecuador  Morocco  Philippines  Sri Lanka
Ethiopia  El Salvador+  Tunisia  Thailand
Gambia  Guyana  Syria  Malaysia













Zambia  Trinidad & Tobago
Zimbabwe  Uruguay
Gabon*  Venezuela
NiYt: Countries below the line are the middle-income countries dropped to form the low-income data set.
*  Franc zone countries
+  Central American countries
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